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Abstract
The present study examines a series of performance measures as
an attempt to resolve the ex post verication problem. These meas-
ures are employed to test the performance persistence hypothesis of
domestic equity funds in Greece, during the period 1998-2004. Cor-
rectly adjusting for risk factors and documented portfolio strategies
explains a signicant part of the reported persistence. The intercept
of the augmented Carhart regression is proposed as the most appro-
priate performance measure. Using this measure, weak evidence for
persistence, only before 2001, is documented. The growth of the fund
industry, the direction of ows to past winners and the integration in
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the international nancial system are suggested to be the reasons for
the absence of performance persistence.
JEL Classication: G14, G15, G21, G23
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1 Introduction
The mutual fund industry has experienced a dramatic growth on a global
basis during the last two decades. Mutual funds are now the preferred in-
vestment vehicle for individuals. Their outstanding success is due to the fact
that they provide access to professional management and a highly diversied
portfolio even for investors with low initial capital. In a world of perfect com-
petition and symmetric information, investing in actively managed mutual
funds is Pareto e¢ cient from a welfare point of view.
However, given the delegated nature of active fund management, a series
of problems related to asymmetric information may occur. Asymmetric in-
formation between the mutual fund shareholder and the manager can arise
in three stages (see Spencer, 2000, for an analytical discussion of asymmetric
information issues in nancial markets). Firstly, there is the possibility of ad-
verse selection. The most capable managers are more likely to get employed
in di¤erent types of investment vehicles, where the compensation structure
is more directly linked to their performance. Closed-end funds, hedge funds
and private banking services could attract the best managers. Secondly, there
is a moral hazard problem. Once investment has taken place, the manager
could attempt to expropriate wealth from the investors, most commonly by
charging a high expense ratio. Thirdly, there is the issue of ex post veri-
cation, i.e. of fairly evaluating the investment outcome. For this purpose,
researchers have suggested various performance measures, according to which
managers should be classied and rewarded.
The problems arising from asymmetric information are even more severe
in small and emerging markets with oligopolistic fund industries and ver-
tically integrated nancial systems. In such markets, managers are more
likely to obtain insider information which they can exploit in their own in-
terest. Furthermore, high expense ratios are often observed, given the lack
of transparency and competition between fund companies. The insu¢ cient
regulatory framework and nancial knowledge of investors, common features
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of emerging markets, make fund management screening and evaluation an
even more di¢ cult task in this case.
Various performance measures have been suggested in the literature. In
order to take into account underlying risk factors, mutual funds are classied
as Winners (W) or Losers (L) using one of the following criteria: raw re-
turns, the Sharpe (1966) ratio, Jensen (1968)s alpha, its augmented version
suggested by Elton et al. (1996) and Gruber (1996), Carhart (1997)s alpha,
and its augmented version to take into account bond returns.
The most common measures are the Sharpe ratio and Jensens alpha. The
former adjusts returns using their variance, as in the mean-variance world of
Markowitz (1952). Such a measure, however, creates an obvious incentive to
undertake higher moments risks. This is common practice among hedge fund
and bond fund managers in emerging markets. Since these risks are priced
in nancial markets (see Harvey and Siddique, 2000), they should be taken
into account when evaluating managers. As for Jensens alpha, this is rooted
in the CAPM tradition. The CAPM is, in principle, a static representation
of capital markets, which ignores their dynamic component. Therefore, it
is an incomplete framework in the presence of stochastically evolving risk
factors (see Merton, 1973). In fact, Size and Value strategies could yield
positive returns without any CAPM beta exposure (see Fama and French,
1993, 1996), and the same applies to momentum strategies (see Jegadeesh
and Titman, 1993).
The empirical evidence showing that these strategies systematically out-
perform alternative ones is puzzling 1. Concluding that there is no risk factor
underlying these strategies is equivalent to admitting free lunches, in the
spirit of Harrison and Kreps (1979). However, it has been suggested by Car-
hart (1997) that the Fama-French and momentum portfolios reect specic
1See Barry et al. (2002) for the apparent success of size and value strategies in the case
of emerging markets, and Rouwenhorst (1998) for that of momentum strategies in a series
of international markets.
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risk factors and should be taken into account. In fact, Campbell and Vuol-
teenaho (2004) show that the Fama-French anomalies can be resolved in an
intertemporal setting, while Petkova (2006) argues that these portfolios are
correlated with shocks to a series of nancial variables.
Employing multi-factor rather than single-factor measures might be a way
to shed more light on this issue. However, whilst most recent studies testing
for performance persistence in the US fund industry use multi-factor meas-
ures à la Carhart2, few studies employ such measures in an international
setting3 and in the case of emerging markets. The present study contributes
to this area of the literature by focusing on Greek domestic equity mutual
funds during the period 1998-2004 and using such an approach, which ad-
justs for risk factors, thereby providing some new unbiased evidence for an
additional market4. The case of Greece is particularly interesting to exam-
ine because the mutual fund industry is oligopolistic, and the Athens Stock
Exchange (ASE) is relatively small in total capitalization and characterized
by illiquidity. Moreover, the market is dominated by a few large size com-
panies and some key market players. However, Greece is an emerging market
quickly turning into a developed one, as a result of EMU membership and
full integration in the international nancial system. This is evident from the
signicant increase in the participation of foreign investors over the period
analysed here (see Figure 2). Such institutional characteristics and the par-
ticipation of foreign investors in the nancial system might be important
factors for fund performance and market e¢ ciency also in other small or
emerging markets. Our dataset being su¢ ciently long and comprehensive,
it can capture the dynamic evolution of the industry, enabling us to evalu-
2The study of Bollen and Busse (2005) is a recent example.
3The studies of Fletcher and Forbes (2002), Tonks (2005) and Cuthbertson et al. (2006)
for UK, Bilson et al. (2005) for Australia and Otten and Bams (2002) for European funds
are among those which use multi-factor models.
4Khorana et al., (2005) stress the importance of wider and more reliable international
evidence.
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ate mutual funds under di¤erent market conditions without the problem of
survivorship bias.
Previewing our results, we nd evidence for persistence over one-year ho-
rizons during the period 1998-2001. After 2001, persistence becomes very
weak or disappears, depending on the employed performance measure. As
we adjust for risk factors using more sophisticated measures and reducing
the bias, the evidence for persistence becomes weaker. The most appropriate
measure appears to be the augmented version of the Carhart one, which in-
cludes a bond index (often neglected, but extremely important, since equity
funds use bonds to reduce their market risk exposure in periods of negative
market returns - see Figure 3). The integration of the Greek market in the
international nancial system and the direction of ows to past winners are
the two factors most likely to account for the lack of persistence after 2001.
The increasing participation of foreign investors increases market e¢ ciency,
reducing the informational advantages of domestic fund managers. Further-
more, relatively high ows to past winners possibly generate a dilution
e¤ect, making it impossible for managers persistently to outperform others.
As for the ex post verication problem, our ndings imply that once excess
returns are correctly decomposed and risk factors are taken into account,
fund managers do not persistently add any extra value to their portfolios
after 2001.
The layout of the paper is the following. Section 2 reviews the existing lit-
erature for the US and international markets. The main features of the Greek
nancial system and fund industry are briey discussed in Section 3. Sec-
tion 4 provides data sources and denitions and reviews various performance
measures to test the persistence hypothesis. Section 5 presents the empirical
evidence, whilst Section 6 contains concluding remarks and suggestions for
future research.
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2 Literature Review
The literature on performance persistence is vast. Most studies have focused
on the US market, but more recently there has been a growing interest in
international markets. Sharpe (1966) and Jensen (1968) in their seminal
papers introduced early measures of persistence. While Sharpe (1966) repor-
ted a signicant relationship between the present and the past performance
of mutual funds over 10-year horizons, Jensen (1968) concluded that future
performance is not predictable. Carlson (1970), using risk-adjusted returns,
found no evidence of persistence over 10-year horizons, and weak evidence
for 5-year horizons.
Subsequently, Lehmann and Modest (1987) also reported evidence of per-
sistence for US equity funds. Grinblatt and Titman (1989) argued that ab-
normal returns are not signicant once transaction costs and management
fees are calculated. However, Brown et al. (1992) suggested that the res-
ults of previous studies may have been spurious because of survivorship bias,
and that therefore the reported persistence could be explained by the fact
that only successful funds survive through time. Hendricks et al. (1993)
and Goetzmann and Ibbotson (1994) argued that persistence is a short-lived
phenomenon, while negative persistence was found even over longer hori-
zons. Kahn and Rudd (1995) extended these results to bond funds. Malkiel
(1995) provided evidence of lack of persistence in the 1980s, while Brown
and Goetzmann (1995) reported persistence for short horizons taking into
account the survivorship bias e¤ect. Gruber (1996) examined whether raw
and risk-adjusted returns can be predicted using performance measures, and
showed that Jensens alpha works better for the former.
Phelps and Detzel (1997) drew the distinction between macropersistence
and micropersistence, the former being due to the persistence of a broad
equity class, the latter to persistence in managerial ability. The study of
Carhart (1997) had a signicant impact on the literature, introducing a new
measure of performance which adjusts for risk factors. Using this new meas-
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ure, he reported no overall persistence, only underperforming funds exhibit-
ing some degree of persistence. Droms and Walker (2001) found no evidence
of persistence over long-horizons, while Bollen and Busse (2005) suggested
that persistence is by its nature a short-term phenomenon, to be found over
short-term horizons such as quarterly periods.
Studies on markets other than the US one include some on the UK mu-
tual fund industry. Examples are those of Blake and Timmermann (1998),
who provided evidence of persistence over short horizons; Fletcher and For-
bes (2002), who instead found no persistence using the Carhart measure;
and Cuthbertson et al. (2005), who argued that few managers genuinely
outperform, while most underperformers exhibit poor skill, not bad luck. As
for other countries, Vos et al. (1995) found that future performance of Aus-
tralian and New Zealand funds is not predictable using current performance
measures. Cortez et al. (1999) examined persistence in Portuguese equity
funds and reported that, if risk-adjusted returns are used, persistence disap-
pears. Dahlquist et al. (2000) provided evidence of no persistence in their
study of Swedish equity funds, while in Casarin et al. (2002) persistence was
reported in the risk-adjusted returns of Italian equity funds, but only on a
short-term basis. Deaves (2004) found persistence only over short horizons
in Canada, whilst Agudo and Magallon (2005) provided mixed evidence for
Spain. Christensen (2005) found no predictive ability of past performance
measures in the case of Denmark. Finally, Otten and Bams (2002) found no
persistence in equity funds from the largest European markets, apart from
the case of the UK.
Table 1 summarises the ndings from the aforementioned studies.
 Table 1 
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3 The case of Greece
The Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) was founded in 1876. Since 1991 the
Capital Markets Commission has been the superintendent authority for all
capital markets. The mutual fund industry was established in 1972 with
the introduction of one equity and one hybrid fund. Since 1989, following
institutional changes to the Greek capital market, the fund industry exper-
ienced rapid growth. While in 1985 there were only two state-controlled
funds managing 4 billion drachmas, by December 2004 there existed 28 fund
companies o¤ering 262 funds of all types, 68 of which were domestic equity
funds, and managing more than 31.65 billion Euros (an equivalent of 10.7
trillion drachmas). Figure 1 shows the number of domestic equity funds as
well as the ASE General Index. Table 2 presents statistics on the equity fund
industry and average returns of the funds compared with the returns on the
ASE General Index. The extraordinary demand for equity fund investments
in 1999 resulted in the average fund size increasing to 266 mil. Euros, up
from only 40 mil. Euros the previous year. The supply side responded to
demand during the following years, with the number of funds on o¤er more
than doubling. Average returns of the funds are similar to the ASE General
Index returns with the exception of 1998-1999, when small cap strategies
yielded higher returns than the General Index, and of 2004, when the ASE
General Index high returns were mainly due to large cap stocks.
The Greek nancial system is oligopolistic and vertically integrated, dom-
inated by the three largest banks, namely the National Bank of Greece, Alpha
Bank and Eurobank. Their capitalization represents 24.44% of total ASE
capitalisation as of December 2004, while they also hold a signicant por-
tion of the other listed companies, either directly or indirectly through their
mutual fund companies. This means that they are key market players and
are able to inuence corporate decisions as shareholders. Furthermore, they
play a signicant role in short- and long-term corporate nancing, being able
to approve or reject business plans and monitor their implementation. This
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is another source of insider information about business prospects. Moreover,
almost all IPOs have been underwritten by one or more of these banks. Even
though the banks as underwriters cannot participate in the IPO directly, this
is possible through their fund management companies. It is also important
to note that these banking groups incorporate brokerage companies, which
carry out transactions for them and their clients, being market makers too.
Finally, these banks control the main fund management companies of the
domestic industry, holding 55.93% of the total assets under management in
December 2001, when their market share of domestic equity funds was as
high as 49.41%.
Therefore, it is clear that these banks play the multiple role of stockholder,
lender, underwriter and investor in the nancial system, which allows them to
access valuable information for investment purposes. This access to higher
quality and costless information gives the funds o¤ered by these banking
groups with a signicant advantage over other mutual funds. Such a market
structure makes it possible to exploit insider or private information, incon-
sistently with market e¢ ciency, even in its strong form, and increases the
informational asymmetry between fund shareholders and managers. Fur-
thermore, the trading activity of these fund companies has not only a direct
impact on prices, but, more importantly, an indirect one through a signalling
e¤ect to the other market participants.5 Under these circumstances, it would
not be surprising if specic funds persistently outperformed their peers, mak-
ing the case of Greece a particularly interesting one to analyse.
5An oligopolistic nancial system may also lead to herding among mutual funds, since
fund companies strongly want to avoid underperforming rivals, even over very short hori-
zons.
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4 Data and Methodology
4.1 Data
All domestic equity funds with data available for two consecutive years have
been included, and therefore the dataset is free of survivorship bias. It spans
the period from 01/01/1998 to 31/12/2004. We use the Net Asset Value
(NAV) of the domestic equity funds, the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) re-
turns as proxied by the General Index returns, the MSCI Government Bond
Index and the risk-free rate as proxied by the 3-month Government Zero-
Coupons. The source for the funds NAVs and Net Flows is the Association
of the Greek Institutional Investors (AGII), while the other series were ob-
tained from Datastream. Returns are calculated on a weekly basis. Data
for the participation of foreign investors in the ASE were provided by the
Central Depository of ASE, while the data for bond holdings were collected
by hand from the fundsreports.
We follow Otten and Bams (2002) in constructing the strategy-mimicking
portfolios. All stocks included in the ASE General Index were utilized. Rank-
ing stocks with respect to the previous years size, we assign the top 30% by
market capitalization to the Big size portfolio and the bottom 30% to the
Small size portfolio. The di¤erence between returns to these two portfolios
yields the size strategy (SMB) return. Ranking stocks according to last years
returns, the di¤erence between the top 30% winners by market capitaliza-
tion and the bottom 30% losers provides the momentum (MOM) portfolio
return. Moreover, the 30% of stocks with the highest book-to-market-value
ratio were assigned to the High Value portfolio, and the 30% of stocks with
the lowest ratio to the Low Value portfolio. The di¤erence between their
respective returns yields the book-to-market value (HML) strategy returns.
All returns were calculated on a weekly basis and the portfolios were annually
rebalanced.6
6We have also used other similar percentages as cuto¤ points for constructing the
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4.2 Performance measures
Raw returns of the mutual funds were calculated using the standard formula:
Rp =
NAVt  NAVt 1
NAVt 1
(1)
These are employed as our rst performance measure. Next we use the
Sharpe ratio, which measures fund excess returns adjusted for their riskiness;
it is given by the ratio:
SR =
Rp  Rf
p
(2)
where Rf is the risk-free rate and p is the standard deviation of the fund
returns.
Jensens alpha measures the ability of the mutual fund manager to add
value over and above the return which would be justied by the systematic
risk of his portfolio. Formally, this is given by the intercept Jensen of the
regression of the fund excess returns on the market index excess returns:
Rp  Rf = Jensen + M(RM  Rf ) + t (3)
where Rm is the stock market return.
The intercept of this single-factor model has also been used to infer the
stock pickingability or selectivityof the manager. This model can be
augmented to include returns on government bonds. It should be noted that
domestic equity funds invest a portion of their assets in government bonds, in
order to reduce their stock market exposure when managers have a negative
view for prospective returns, and to earn a higher interest rate for their non-
stock holdings. A domestic equity fund has the obligation to invest at least
65% of its total assets in ASE stocks according to the Greek mutual funds
legislation. As a result, non-stock holdings can be signicantly high. Since
strategies portfolios - the results were almost identical and are available from the authors
upon request.
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a performance measure estimates the value a manager adds to his portfolio
over and above the returns justied by known risk factors, Elton et al. (1996)
and Gruber (1996) suggest that the excess bond return should be included in
order to allow for fund returns from bond holdings. Hence, the augmented
model is given by:
Rp  Rf = Jensen + M(RM  Rf ) + B(RB  Rf ) + t (4)
Moving on to multi-factor models, the three-factor model of Fama and
French (1996) employed here is the following:
Rp  Rf = FF + M(RM  Rf ) + 1SMB + 2HML+ t (5)
The intercept of this regression is interpreted as a performance measure.
Following this approach, we are able to capture excess returns generated
by tactical asset allocation strategies exploiting the inconsistencies of the
CAPM. More specically, excess fund returns are decomposed into excess
market returns, returns generated by buying small size stocks and selling big
size stocks (Small Minus Big- SMB), and returns generated by buying stocks
with high book-to-market ratios and selling stocks with low book-to-market
ratios (High Minus Low- HML). The intercept of this regression represents
the value the manager has added to his portfolio over and above what could
be justied by market risk and generated by these known strategies.
One step further, we use the Carhart (1997) measure, which builds on
the Fama and French model but also captures returns generated by the mo-
mentum e¤ect as analyzed in Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). This strategy
(MOM) implies buying and selling stocks with high and low past years re-
turns respectively.
The four-factor model is given by:
Rp Rf = Carhart+M(RM Rf )+1SMB+2HML+3MOM+t (6)
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The intercept of this regression- Carhart- can be used as a performance
measure and it takes into account not only market risk but also excess returns
generated by these well-documented strategies.
Lastly, the four-factor model is augmented to include the bond index
return. We would argue that the intercept of this regression- AC- is the most
appropriate performance measure to solve the ex post verication problem,
since it also includes bond returns, which, as already mentioned, are used
e¤ectively by managers to reduce market risk exposure in a bear market:
Rp Rf = AC+M(RM Rf )+1SMB+2HML+3MOM+B(RB Rf )+t
(7)
4.3 Non-parametric tests
In order to test the persistence hypothesis, contingency tables for each of
the measures presented above are constructed and a series of non-parametric
tests are carried out. These are the Z-test proposed by Malkiel (1995), the
cross-product ratio test of Brown and Goetzmann (1995), and the chi-squared
test of Kahn and Rudd (1995). To construct these test statistics, we classify
the mutual funds as winners (W) or losers (L) depending on whether their
performance measure was above or below the median value for each time
period.
As we only have estimates of performance, instead of ranking funds us-
ing only the point estimates, we also take into account whether these are
signicantly di¤erent from zero. Therefore, we rstly rank the funds with
positive and signicant estimates, then those with measures not signicantly
di¤erent from zero, and nally those with negative and signicant estimates.
Clearly, ranking as a top winner (loser) a fund with a high (low), but insigni-
cantly di¤erent than zero, point estimate of its performance measure would
generate spurious results.
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The null hypothesis for these three non-parametric tests is that of no
persistence. In the Malkiel (1995) test, no persistence means that a past
winner will be either winner or loser next period with equal probability p =
0:5. The test statistic is calculated as follows:
M =
(WW   (WW +WL)  0:5)p
(WW +WL)  0:5  0:5 (8)
and it follows a standard normal distribution.
In the test of Brown and Goetzmann (1995) the null hypothesis is that
the number of funds changing category next period is equal to the number
of funds remaining in the same category. The hypothesis is tested using the
cross-product ratio (CPR):
CPR =
WW  LL
WL  LW (9)
Values of the statistic greater than unity indicate persistence, while values
smaller than unity indicate reversal. For the statistical signicance of the test
values, the following Z-test is constructed:
Z =
lnCPR
lnCPR
(10)
where
ln(CPR) =
r
1
WW
+
1
LL
+
1
WL
+
1
LW
(11)
Finally, Kahn and Rudd (1995) use a chi-square test, which compares
the observed with the expected frequency of an event. In the case of no
persistence, the expected number of winners remaining winners is equal to
the expected number of winners turning losers, as well as the number of losers
remaining losers and the number of losers becoming winners. Cortez et al.
(1999) specify this chi-square statistic as:
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2 =
(WW  N=4)2
N=4
+
(WL N=4)2
N=4
+
(LW  N=4)2
N=4
+
(LL N=4)2
N=4
(12)
which follows a chi-square distribution with one degree of freedom.
5 Empirical Results
This section presents the results of the non-parametric tests for the perform-
ance measures discussed in the previous section. The persistence hypothesis
is tested on an annual basis in all cases.
5.1 Raw returns
The rst measure used is raw returns. The classication of the funds across
time and the statistics of the non-parametric tests are given in Table 3. There
is signicant evidence of persistence in 3 out of the 6 examined periods (1998-
99, 2000-01, 2003-04). Throughout, past winners have signicantly higher
probability (57%) to remain winners than to turn losers next period.
Such persistence could be mainly explained by the investment strategy
of the funds. Since raw returns are not adjusted for risk, equity funds which
invest in highly volatile stocks are more likely to be characterized as winners
in periods with positive market returns and as losers in periods with negative
market returns. Therefore, persistence is observed more often in years with
the same sign for market returns. On the other hand, when the stock market
trend is reversed, as in the period 2002-2003, past winners are more likely
to become losers (only 41% of the past winners remained winners in this
period). Clearly, such a performance measure is ine¢ cient and it can lead
to spurious results, since persistence is due mainly to market returns, rather
than managerial ability.
 Table 3 
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5.2 Sharpe Ratio
By contrast, the Sharpe ratio adjusts funds returns for risk using their stand-
ard deviation, thereby taking into account the volatility of the investment
strategy. Table 4 reports the results for the persistence hypothesis using this
measure. Signicant persistence is observed, mainly during the same three
periods as in the case of raw returns. Interestingly, overall persistence is
even more signicant, as 59% of past winners are classied as winners in the
following year too.
The persistence reported here is due to the fact that a number of funds
managed to achieve high excess returns without undertaking higher volatility
risk. Hence, some classes of stocks had higher returns than other classes
with the same volatility. The funds which invested in these classes of stocks
managed to achieve persistently higher Sharpe ratios.
 Table 4 
5.3 Jensens measure
The next measures used are Jensens alpha (regression 3) and the intercept
of the augmented market model (regression 4). Table 5 and Table 6 report
the results for these measures. When using Jensens alpha we nd evidence
of persistence in 2000-2001 as well as in 2003-2004, while the augmented
model implies that persistence in these periods is not statistically signic-
ant. Compared to the results obtained using the Sharpe ratio, persistence
is now marginally lower, reecting the di¤erence between systematic risk as
measured in the market model and fund riskiness as captured by the Sharpe
ratio.
Throughout the periods analysed, past winners (losers) are still more
likely to remain winners (losers), but the augmented model reduces persist-
ence further. As Elton et al. (1996) and Gruber (1996) have suggested,
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an appropriate performance measure should adjust for bond returns, since
equity funds are allowed to invest a signicant portion of their non-stock
holdings in short- or long-term bonds. As Figure 3 shows, managers signi-
cantly increased their bond holdings during the bear market of 2000-2003.
This strategy was reversed in 2003, when stock prices started to rise again.
Hence, it can be argued that investment in assets other than equity is the
outcome of a deliberate strategy and, therefore, one should account for the
corresponding returns.
The superiority of the augmented model can be illustrated through an
example. The stock market faced signicant negative returns in the period
2000-2001. Some equity funds shifted part of their assets to bonds. The
single-factor model may result in a biased fund beta and attribute bond
returns to Jensens alpha, leading to the classication of such a fund as a
winner. This is the reason why we nd persistence in this period (see Table
5). On the other hand, the augmented model correctly assigns these returns
to the exposure to the risk associated with bond returns. As a result, no
signicant persistence is now observed during this period (see Table 6): as
one correctly adjusts for risk, the evidence for persistence weakens. Returns,
which were previously characterized as abnormal, are now explained in term
of known risk factors.
 Table 5 
 Table 6 
5.4 Fama-French and Carhart measures
Next we use the Fama-French model (see regression 5) to adjust for known
sources of risk. As already explained in Section 3, this regression incorpor-
ates portfolio strategies, which exploit the size and book-to-market anomalies
documented in Fama and French (1993, 1996). Using this regression, we ad-
just for returns generated by strategies which invest in small and value stocks.
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This is quite important because the ASE General Index is highly dependent
on a few large capitalization stocks. Therefore, for periods during which the
returns of small size stocks signicantly exceed the returns of the large cap-
italization stocks, the single-factor model will assign these excess returns to
positive performance. Hence, funds which follow small cap strategies will ap-
pear to have positive or negative performance, which persists through time,
even though this is solely due to the investment strategy.
Table 7 reports the results for persistence using as a performance measure
the intercept of regression (5). There is signicant evidence of persistence
during the period 2000-2001, and only weak evidence during 1998-1999.
 Table 7 
We augment the Fama and French regression adding the momentum
strategy returns. The intercept of regression (6) is Carharts alpha. ASE
returns exhibit signicant serial correlation, especially during pronounced
upward or downward movements. This is a well known characteristic, and
fund managers are expected to employ tactical asset allocation schemes to
capture momentum. In a small market with oligopolistic mutual fund in-
dustry, momentum strategies may be even more important, since fund man-
agers tend to mimic each other.7 Therefore, hot stocksare highly attractive
for managers who fear they might miss an upward trend.
Table 8 presents the results of the tests for persistence using Carharts
alpha as a performance measure. Evidence for signicant persistence is found
only during 2000-2001. Persistence is also detected during 1998-1999, but this
is not statistically signicant given the small number of funds (27) examined
in this period. The estimates of persistence are marginally lower than those
based on the previous measures. It is worth highlighting that, as can be
seen from Table 8, persistence is found only in the rst part of the sample
(1998-2001), while after 2001 there is almost no evidence for it.
7See Wermers (1999) for a discussion on mutual fund herding.
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 Table 8 
As previously argued, the intercept of regression 7 can be considered
the most appropriate performance measure to solve the ex post verication
problem. This is because it captures most of the strategies documented in
the literature for tactical asset allocation as well as the exposure to bond
returns risk. Therefore, it provides a measure of genuine added value, net of
returns attributed to known risk factors. Table 9 reports the results.
 Table 9 
These are quite interesting, since persistence is signicantly lower. Overall
persistence is statistically insignicant, while, after 2001, funds are more
likely to change classication from year to year than to remain winners or
losers. Weak evidence for persistence is found for 1998-1999, while signicant
persistence is documented in 2000-2001. However, this is weaker compared
to the estimates based on the Carhart measure or the previous measures.
5.5 Discussion
The results presented above lead to some striking conclusions for the Greek
mutual fund industry. Firstly, if known risk factors and documented portfolio
strategies are taken into account, performance persistence almost disappears,
even over short horizons, as the 1-year periods employed here. This suggests
that evidence for performance persistence could be due to the failure to adjust
for these factors. In particular, bond returns and momentum strategies seem
to be two factors which, if omitted, can yield spurious persistence results.
Secondly, evidence of persistence is found only in the rst half of the
examined period. No persistence is documented after 2001. This is quite an
interesting result considering the fact that the number of funds more than
doubled over the three years from 1998 to 2001 (see Figure 1). On the one
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hand, it could be expected that old funds, which experienced the bear market,
would be handicapped after 1999 relative to new ones entering the market.
The reasons would be the massive outows that past losers faced and the
inability to get rid of badly performing stocks. On the other hand, old funds
could be expected to perform better, exploiting the better quality of market
research and the higher ability of their more experienced managers. It seems
that these two e¤ects, working in opposite directions in a rapidly changing
market, resulted in no persistence.
To account for the lack of persistence after 2001, the role of foreign in-
vestors as well as the behaviour of the ows should also be considered. The
Greek stock market started being classied as a mature market in 2000-2001,
which coincides with the entry of the country into the EMU. Signicant reg-
ulatory improvements took place during the 1998-1999 period of sharp price
increases and the subsequent prolonged period of negative returns (2000-
2002). The new environment enabled the share of foreign investors to rise
signicantly after 2001, crowding outnoise traders (see Figure 2). More
precisely, while foreign investors held only 21.62% of the total ASE capital-
ization in May 2001, this share had increased to 38.45% by December 2004.
The integration of the market in the international nancial system and the
more transparent regulatory framework would be inconsistent with persist-
ently higher abnormal returns earned by domestic equity funds. It is likely
that fund managers were able to add value to their portfolios, before 2001,
by exploiting noise tradersine¢ cient investment strategies, and that the re-
placement of the noise traders with more sophisticated foreign investors after
2001 played a signicant role in reducing domestic fundsabnormal returns
and their persistence.
The behaviour of ows is another important factor when investigating
performance persistence in open-end funds. Managers have to adjust invest-
ment decisions to the size and the timing of the ows in and out of funds. A
simple way to examine the direction of ows is to classify funds according to
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specic performance measures at the end of each year, and to calculate the
total ows to each fund during the following 6 months 8. Table 10 compares
the average ow to the top 5 funds with the average ow to the bottom 5
classied according to raw returns, the Sharpe Ratio, and the augmented
Carhart measure respectively, from 1998 to 2003. In general, ows are to-
wards past winners, classied as such on the basis of raw returns and the
augmented Carhart measure, for most of the years, while the classication
according to the Sharpe Ratio yields mixed results.
 Table 10 
Linking this evidence to the lack of persistence, one can argue that the
direction of ows to past winners plays a partial, yet signicant, role in
preventing them from being top performers again. Being obliged to invest
a signicant amount (owing to the new ows) in a relatively short horizon,
managers cannot be as successful as with their initial investment strategy.
Hence, there is a dilution e¤ect such that managers cannot consistently
outperform others (see Greene and Hodges, 2002, and Berk and Greene,
2004, for a related discussion).
Finally, it should be noted that we do not nd any asymmetry in perform-
ance persistence, which is contrary to US studies documenting that overall
persistence is mainly due to negative persistence (see, e.g., Brown and Goet-
zmann, 1995 and Carhart, 1997). This nding essentially implies that man-
agers with bad skills do not outnumber those with good skills.
8In addition to past ranking, ows are related to other fund characteristics, such as
size and age, brand name and advertisement as well as personal attributes of the man-
agers. Furthermore, the relationship between performance and ows is clearly non-linear.
Nevertheless, this approach provides a good guide for the purposes of the present analysis.
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6 Conclusions
This study has analysed performance persistence in domestic equity funds in
the Greek market, during a period characterized by di¤erent market phases,
a remarkable increase in the number of mutual funds and the integration
of the market in the international nancial system. A series of perform-
ance measures suggested in the literature have been used, after discussing
their assumptions and implications. The results show that, when adjusting
for known risk factors and portfolio strategies, the evidence for persistence
gradually weakens. Using an appropriate performance measure to test the
persistence hypothesis (specically, the augmented Carhart measure includ-
ing bond returns) is crucial to solve the ex post verication problem. Unless
risk factors are taken into account, the results might be spurious, making the
problems arising from asymmetric information even more severe.
Performance persistence has been found in the rst half of our sample,
while there is no such evidence after 2001. The integration in the interna-
tional nancial system with the associated signicant increase in the number
of foreign institutional investors during this period, and the dilutione¤ect
generated by the direction of ows to past winners might account for the lack
of persistence after 2001. Regulatory improvements and a more competitive
fund industry also made the market more e¢ cient. Moreover, no signicant
di¤erence between positive and negative persistence has been documented.
This might be due to the remarkable growth of the fund industry during the
period under examination.
These ndings could be relevant also for other emerging markets with
oligopolistic and vertically integrated nancial industries, which are in the
process of becoming more integrated internationally. Increased international
competition and the use of appropriate performance measures might increase
market e¢ ciency and reduce informational asymmetries, resulting in a lower
degree of persistence. Regarding future research, it would be interesting
to examine the persistence hypothesis for foreign funds investing in Greece,
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when appropriate data become available. This would shed further light on
the equilibrating mechanism which has eliminated persistence after 2001.
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7 Appendix
Table 1: Classication of the Literature
Author Year Period Funds Market Persistence Comments
Sharpe 1966 1954-63 34 US Yes Past and future
rankings positively
correlated
Jensen 1968 1945-64 115 US No No predictability
of future
performance
Carlson 1970 1948-67 82 US Yes Persistence in
5-year but not
in 10-year horizons
Lehmann
and Modest
1987 1968-82 130 US Yes Some evidence of
abnormal return
persistence
Grinblatt
and Titman
1992 1974-84 279 US Yes Weak evidence on
5-year horizons
Hendricks,
Patel and
Zeckhauser
1993 1974-88 165 US Yes Persistence on
quarterly basis
Goetzmann
and Ibbotson
1994 1976-88 728 US Yes Persistence in
3-year horizons
Kahn
and Rudd
1994 1983-90 300 US Partial Persistence for
bond funds
No for equity funds
Brown and
Goetzmann
1995 1976-88 829 US Yes Persistence in
1-year horizons
Malkiel 1995 1971-90 724 US Partial Persistence in 70s
not in 80s
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Table 1 (Continued)
Author Year Period Funds Market Persistence Comments
Vos, Brown
and Christie
1995 1988-94 26 New
Zealand
No No persistence for
raw and risk-
adjusted returns
Elton, Gruber
and Blake
1996 1977-93 188 US Yes Persistence in
1-year and
3-year horizons
Gruber 1996 1985-94 270 US Yes Four-factor alpha
exhibits predictive
ability
Carhart 1997 1962-93 1892 US No Persistence
observed due
to momentum
Sauer 1997 1976-92 Morning-
star
funds
US Partial No persistence
when adjusted
for style
Blake and
Timmermann
1998 1972-95 2300 UK Yes Short-term
persistence
Cortez
et al.
1999 1994-98 12 Portugal Partial Persistence for
raw returns only
Jain
and Wu
2000 1994-96 294 US No No persistence
once the fund
is advertised
Dahlquist
et al.
2000 1992-97 210 Sweden Partial Persistence for
money-market
funds only
Droms
and Walker
2001 1971-90 151 US Yes Short-term
persistence
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Table 1 (Continued)
Author Year Period Funds Market Persistence Comments
Hallahan
and Fa¤
2001 1989-95 294 Australia No Performance
reversal
Casarin
et al.
2001 1992-99 57 Italy Yes Short-term
persistence
Otten
and Bams
2002 1991-98 506 Europe Partial Persistence
only in UK
Fletcher
and Forbes
2002 1982-96 724 UK Partial Persistence only
due to lack of
risk adjustment
Deaves 2004 1988-98 300 Canada Yes Short-term
persistence
Agudo and
Magallon
2005 1994-2000 116 Spain Partial Weak evidence
of persistence
Bilson
et al.
2005 1991-00 417 Australia No Persistence due
to lack of
risk-adjustment
Christensen 2005 1996-03 47 Denmark No No short-
or long-term
persistence
Bollen
and Busse
2005 1985-95 230 US Yes Persistence on
quarterly basis
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Table 2: Domestic equity funds 1998-2004
No. funds Av. Size (mil. E) EW Return VW Return ASE Return
1998 34 40.63 86.28% 95.03% 85.02%
1999 53 266.67 158.60% 167.79% 102.19%
2000 78 94.20 -45.66% -44.93% -41.52%
2001 76 66.66 -23.97% -24.68% -23.53%
2002 76 44.58 -27.24% -28.99% -32.53%
2003 69 60.65 23.40% 24.77% 29.46%
2004 68 63.57 10.23% 14.94% 23.09%
Note: The EW Return is the annual arithmetic mean return of the funds,
while the VW Return indicates the average return using weighted by the
size of each fund. The ASE Return is the annual return of the ASE General
Index.
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Table 3: Raw Returns
Number of Percentage Malkiel B&G
Funds W-W W-L L-W L-L Repeat W Z-test CPR Z-stat 2
1998-99 27 9 4 4 10 0.69 1.39 5.63 2:05 4:56
1999-00 32 10 6 9 7 0.63 1.00 1.30 0.36 1.25
2000-01 46 13 10 7 16 0.57 0.63 2.97 1.76 3:91
2001-02 64 19 14 12 19 0.58 0.87 2.15 1.50 2.38
2002-03 61 13 19 17 12 0.41 -1.06 0.48 -1.40 2.15
2003-04 60 20 11 10 19 0.65 1.62 3.45 2:29 5:47
TOTAL 290 84 64 59 83 0.57 1.64 1.85 2:58 6:86
(*) denotes statistical signicance at 5% level- (**) denotes statistical signicance at 1% level
Table 4: Sharpe Ratio
Number of Percentage Malkiel B&G
Funds W-W W-L L-W L-L Repeat W Z-test CPR Z-stat 2
1998-99 27 9 4 4 10 0.69 1.39 5.63 2:05 4:56
1999-00 32 10 6 8 8 0.63 1.00 1.67 0.71 1.00
2000-01 46 12 11 6 17 0.52 0.21 3.09 1.78 5:30
2001-02 64 20 13 12 19 0.61 1.22 2.44 1.74 3.13
2002-03 61 16 16 14 15 0.5 0.00 1.07 0.13 0.18
2003-04 60 21 10 9 20 0.68 1:98 4.67 2:77 8:13
TOTAL 290 88 60 53 89 0.59 2:30 2.46 3:74 14:47
(*) denotes statistical signicance at 5% level- (**) denotes statistical signicance at 1% level
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Table 5: Jensen alpha
Number of Percentage Malkiel B&G
Funds W-W W-L L-W L-L Repeat W Z-test CPR Z-stat 2
1998-99 27 8 5 5 9 0.62 0.83 2.88 1.33 1.89
1999-00 32 8 7 11 6 0.53 0.26 0.62 -0.65 1.75
2000-01 46 15 8 6 17 0.65 1.46 5.31 2:59 7:39
2001-02 64 18 15 13 18 0.55 0.52 1.66 1.01 1.13
2002-03 61 16 15 14 16 0.52 0.18 1.22 0.39 0.18
2003-04 60 20 11 9 20 0.65 1.62 4.04 2:54 6:80
TOTAL 290 85 61 58 86 0.58 1:99 2.07 3:04 9:39
(*) denotes statistical signicance at 5% level- (**) denotes statistical signicance at 1% level
Table 6: Augmented Jensen
Number of Percentage Malkiel B&G
Funds W-W W-L L-W L-L Repeat W Z-test CPR Z-stat 2
1998-99 27 9 4 4 10 0.69 1.39 5.63 2:05 4:56
1999-00 32 10 6 9 7 0.63 1.00 1.30 0.36 1.25
2000-01 46 13 11 7 15 0.54 0.41 2.53 1.51 3.04
2001-02 64 17 17 15 15 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.25
2002-03 61 17 15 13 16 0.53 0.35 1.39 0.65 0.57
2003-04 60 18 13 11 18 0.58 0.90 2.27 1.55 2.53
TOTAL 290 84 66 59 81 0.56 1.47 1.75 2:35 5:92
(*) denotes statistical signicance at 5% level- (**) denotes statistical signicance at 1% level
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Table 7: Three-factor Fama and French
Number of Percentage Malkiel B&G
Funds W-W W-L L-W L-L Repeat W Z-test CPR Z-stat 2
1998-99 27 9 4 5 9 0.69 1.39 4.05 1.71 3.07
1999-00 32 9 7 9 7 0.56 0.50 1.00 0.00 0.50
2000-01 46 17 6 4 19 0.74 2.29 13.46 3:58 15:04
2001-02 64 17 17 15 15 0.50 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.25
2002-03 61 16 16 14 15 0.50 0.00 1.07 0.13 0.18
2003-04 60 17 14 13 16 0.55 0.54 1.49 0.77 0.67
TOTAL 290 85 64 60 81 0.57 1.72 1.79 2:46 6:30
(*) denotes statistical signicance at 5% level- (**) denotes statistical signicance at 1% level
Table 8: Carhart alpha
Number of Percentage Malkiel B&G
Funds W-W W-L L-W L-L Repeat W Z-test CPR Z-stat 2
1998-99 27 9 4 5 9 0.69 1.39 4.05 1.71 3.07
1999-00 32 9 7 10 6 0.56 0.50 0.77 -0.36 1.25
2000-01 46 15 7 4 20 0.68 1.71 10.71 3:32 14:00
2001-02 64 16 15 15 18 0.52 0.18 1.28 0.49 0.38
2002-03 61 16 15 14 16 0.52 0.18 1.22 0.39 0.18
2003-04 60 16 15 14 15 0.52 0.18 1.14 0.26 0.13
TOTAL 290 81 63 62 84 0.56 1.50 1.74 2:34 5:59
(*) denotes statistical signicance at 5% level- (**) denotes statistical signicance at 1% level
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Table 9: Augmented Carhart
Number of Percentage Malkiel B&G
Funds W-W W-L L-W L-L Repeat W Z-test CPR Z-stat 2
1998-99 27 9 4 5 9 0.69 1.39 4.05 1.71 3.07
1999-00 32 9 7 8 8 0.56 0.50 1.29 0.35 0.25
2000-01 46 15 8 6 17 0.65 1.46 5.31 2:59 7:39
2001-02 64 16 18 16 14 0.47 -0.34 0.78 -0.50 0.50
2002-03 61 15 17 15 14 0.47 -0.35 0.82 -0.38 0.31
2003-04 60 15 16 14 15 0.48 -0.18 1.00 0.01 0.13
TOTAL 290 79 70 64 77 0.53 0.74 1.36 1.30 1.94
(*) denotes statistical signicance at 5% level- (**) denotes statistical signicance at 1% level
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Table 10: Direction of Flows (000 e)
Panel A: Raw Returns
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Top 5 95,192 -7,756 28,724 -1,982 -233 2,340
Bottom 5 34,446 -806 -1,143 -340 -2,135 -241
Panel B: Sharpe Ratio
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Top 5 92,495 -3,840 -839 -2,514 -216 1,037
Bottom 5 34,446 -2,221 -385 261 -736 -3,729
Panel C: Augmented Carhart
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Top 5 60,074 3,904 32,321 -2,514 77 2,618
Bottom 5 34,446 -49 -673 -398 -531 -241
Note: Table 10 presents the average total ow over the next 6 months to
the Top 5 and Bottom 5 funds, classied as such according to their Raw
returns, Sharpe Ratio and augmented Carhart measure at the end of each
year, 1998-2003.
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Figure 1: The ASE General Index and the Number of Domestic Equity funds,
1998-2004.
Note: The continuous line (left scale) shows the ASE General Index and
the dashed line (right scale) shows the number of domestic equity funds
from 1998-2004
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Figure 2: Holdings of foreign and individual domestic investors as a percent-
age of total ASE capitalisation, 2001-2004.
Note: The continuous line shows the share of the ASE capitalisation held
by foreign investors and the dashed line shows the corresponding share by
domestic individuals.
40
Figure 3: Bond holdings of domestic equity funds as a percentage of their
total assets under management, 2000-2004.
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